Mail.Liberal-Judaism

• Jonathan Shaffer <Jshaffer@spmd.com>

• sandgryan@att.net (Scott Ryan)

• Allan Tulchin <tulc@midway.uchicago.edu>

• Yaakov Menken <menken@torah.org>

From: Jonathan Shaffer <Jshaffer@spmd.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2000 16:32:08 -0400
Subject: Eilan and a Jewish Memory

Arthur's recent comparison of the Eilan Gonzalez case and the Mortara
abduction is not as clear-cut as he makes it. It's all a matter of
perspective. One could look at the same facts and conclude that Eilan's
mother was like the Jewish Mortara parents trying to raise her child in
freedom and the abductors are the Cuban Government and his father who seek
to return him to an enslaved land. In twenty years when Eilan is a
professor of Communist theology we can decide who was right. 

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From: sandgryan@att.net (Scott Ryan)
Date: Fri Apr 28  7:57:52 US/Pacific 2000
Subject: Re: Gay Marriage

Allan Tulchin writes:

> Scott continues to assert that proponents of gay marriage are out to force
> Southern Baptists and other opponents of it to accept such marriages
> religiously.  *Persuade* I might accept, but force is absurd.  They just
> want the same legal rights in civil law as other couples who have gone
> through the appropriate legal forms.

Lisa Solomon replies:

> If this was Scott's assertion, I must ask if proponents of gay marriage are
> attempting to have others accept such marriages *religiously*, or to
> recognize the couple's non-religious *rights* that are conferred upon them
> by virtue of being legally married?

Well, no, Allan's remark was not a very good summary of my own statements, but
that is one of the points I let pass in the interests of space (in part
because it is a bit beyond the scope of the list). Since Lisa asks, though...

First of all, readers interested in my opinions on civil rights and
"anti-discrimination" laws might want to read the following piece:

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_rockwell/20000427_xclro_boy_scouts.shtml
(Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., "Boy Scouts, gay lobby and compromises,"
WorldNetDaily, April 27, 2000). Rockwell's remarks here are also an excellent
statement of my own views.

(Incidentally, as regards the Boy Scouts case specifically: some readers may
be interested to hear that the Institute for Justice is helping out the Scouts
with the full support of a gay and lesbian libertarian group which completely
opposes the reasoning behind the BSA policy but which agrees that the
organization's rights of free association and exclusion should be protected by
law. I don't recall the name of the group but I can dig it out if someone
wants to know. At any rate this issue is not a simple case of "gay
vs. anti-gay.")

But it is oversimplifying things to say (as Lisa does) that proponents of
same-sex civil unions simply "want the same non-religious rights to apply to
homosexual couples as those enjoyed by heterosexual couples." Part (not all)
of the problem is that the protection of certain "civil rights" of some people
entails the infringement of the actual rights of others -- for example, the
right of free association and exclusion.

Two recent pieces that deal with a related "discrimination" issue may be found
at:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/A7551-2000Apr2 4.html (Steven
Pearlstein, "Canada Court to Decide if Evangelical School Can Train Teachers,"
Washington Post Online, April 24, 2000).

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_fosterj_news/20000425_xnfoj_tufts_shut.shtml
(Julie Foster, "TESTING THE FAITH: Tufts shuts out Christian group: Religious
club de-funded in secret meeting because it wouldn't accept lesbian leader,"
WorldNetDaily, April 25, 2000).

Each of these cases involves what I would call clear-cut "discrimination"
against the rights of religious Christian organizations -- not churches, but
organizations whose express purpose and function is religious. Does that mean
they involve "forcing" religious organizations into "religious" acceptance of
homosexual practices? You decide.

Warning: don't assume too readily that you know my opinion of either
case. Obviously I disagree with the reasoning of each set of anti-religious
discriminators.  But in each case, there is a _private_ (non-State)
organization exercising what, on the face of it, seems to be its perfectly
legitimate right of exclusion. The British Columbia College of Teachers is a
private self-regulatory body which would appear to have every right to deny
its accreditation to a particular school; Tufts University is a private school
which would also appear to have every right to determine what it will and will
not accept as a "student organization."

However, each situation is complicated by the fact that there are State
benefits which depend on the approval of such private organizations; sorting
out the details is a bit more complex than it might appear at first glance.
For example, the BCCT is controlled by the approximately 50,000 State-licensed
teachers in British Columbia, and the province itself is very strongly
socialist; the schools to which this licensing applies are of course _public_
schools. Also, the funds Tufts is denying to this particular student
organization are not necessarily "private" funds; many nominally "private"
schools nevertheless receive various forms of "public" funding (and other
State support).

Such complications make the moral issues difficult to sift through. But I
think these two pieces illustrate one important point fairly well:
anti-discrimination legislation _does_, very much, have the effect -- quite
purposefully -- of crippling the ability of religion-based organizations to
apply religious standards for internal purposes. That this effect is so often
indirect -- as it usually is when it's backed by other sorts of Statist
legislation -- just makes it that much more insidious.

I'm also pointing these cases out because they show so clearly what sorts of
group are and are not the typical targets of "anti-discrimination" laws. Even
if these acts of discrimination _were_ purely "private" and therefore legally
acceptable by libertarian standards, it would still be odd that they haven't
engendered howls of protest from the folks who _do_ favor laws against private
discrimination. (Or has the Reform Action Center already fired off an angry
position paper to Tufts University President John DiBiaggio?)

For some, it seems, discriminating against _religious_ people and
organizations is perfectly okay -- but the use of religious standards is
itself an _impermissible_ form of discrimination even when practiced
internally by a "private" religious organization.

All of which ought to give pause to anyone who thinks left-liberalism is
compatible with the protection of Jewish observance.

Scott Ryan
SandGRyan@worldnet.att.net

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From: Allan Tulchin <tulc@midway.uchicago.edu>
Date: Fri Apr 28 10:04:26 US/Pacific 2000
Subject: Moral Standards

[Moderator's Note: This is a continuation of a previous discussion under the
subject "Gay Marriage"]

In his most recent post, Scott Ryan writes:

> ...law should at least try, insofar as it is possible, to "mimic" what would
> happen in that ideal world in which individual rights were fully protected
> -- and, yes, of course to maintain rather than undermine (since by
> hypothesis it cannot help doing one or the other) what I do, after all,
> believe to be divinely revealed moral standards.

Let me state what I believe the libertarian position to be. (I should probably
mention that I am not one.) A libertarian would argue that the state should
only make regulations that (a) prevent one person from hurting another or (b)
are necessary to ensure that end (for example, some taxation is necessary to
pay the police). Historically, that position arose in the aftermath of the
religious wars of the seventeenth century, as a reaction to the bloodshed that
ensued when people people tried to force their moral standards on each
other. I therefore don't see how a strict libertarian could possibly wish to
use the law to maintain "divinely revealed moral standards."  The whole
purpose of libertarianism is to keep the law neutral, so that it cannot be
used either to maintain or to undermine religious belief. I might add that
Jews and other representatives of minority religious views ought to be
particularly scrupulous in this respect.

This leads me to a reply to Robert Kaiser.  I take the position that some
matters are more knowable than others.  My religious (and political) opinions
are very deeply, indeed passionately, held, but that does not mean I do not
recognize them as opinions which are not subject to the same kinds of proof
that I expect in other spheres. The Sh'ma is true, but it isn't true in the
same way as my statement that I went out for pizza last night. Religious
opinions can be debated, and such debate can be useful in clarifying
positions, but at the level of key axioms we are dealing with things that are
not rational and where argument can therefore frequently produce far more heat
than light. If challenged, I will assert that the Jewish view of things is the
best one; but I would always assert that with the preface that mine is an
unprovable opinion which I would be happy to explain but loath to try to prove
as a theorem, QED.

Allan Tulchin
tulc@midway.uchicago.edu

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From: Yaakov Menken <menken@torah.org>
Date: Fri Apr 28 17:33:46 US/Pacific 2000
Subject: Which Grandchild Would You Prefer?

Which of the following grandchildren would you prefer:

    A) A good, modern person who did not follow Judaism, and was not
       defined as a Jew, or
    B) A pious, Lubavitcher Chassid with a big black hat and coat?

In the course of researching my response to Mark Ring's questions
about Reform v. Orthodox, I came across a very startling article --
which gave rise to that question. I think it's worth considering.

I was going to point out that if one is looking for "bashing" and
defensiveness in print, one would be hard-pressed to find it in
Orthodox publications. In the last several issues of Agudath Israel's
Jewish Observer, the Young Israel Viewpoint, and the Orthodox Union's
Jewish Action, I can recall only one recent reference to liberal
Judaism. In that article, the writer criticized those who believe that
a Reform woman wearing a Tallit is simply scorning traditional
Judaism. On the contrary, said the writer, that woman is expressing
her attachment to Judaism as she knows it. He went out of his way to
frame a Reform non-halachic practice as positive rather than negative,
not only from the perspective of the practitioner, but from that of
the Orthodox reader as well.

With complete confidence, I can say that a typical "fanatical,
ultra-Orthodox" reader of the Jewish Observer (the most right-wing of
the three) would choose a Reform grandchild over a non-Jewish
grandchild -- 100 times out of 100.

In Reform Judaism magazine, on the other hand, essays or even brief
asides which characterize Orthodoxy as pietistic, fundamentalist, even
fanatical, are a constant refrain. Rabbi Maslin's article on
"authentic Jews" was one example, "Liberal Judaism: A light unto the
Israelis" is another. Robert Seltzer says that Rabbi Richard Levy's
proposal for new, more traditional principles for Reform "may be part
of the global trend toward a right-wing, conservative religiosity --
even fundamentalism." Even an interview with Leonard Nimoy contains
the canard that Hasidim would regard him as "not a Jew."

This is a pervasive defensiveness which is profoundly unhealthy -- not
only for Reform-Orthodox relations, but for Reform Judaism
itself. Reform must stand on its own merit, for it is hardly the only
alternative to Orthodoxy. Many young people from Reform families are
choosing neither Reform nor Orthodoxy -- they are choosing to be
nothing Jewish at all.

And then I looked at the most recent issue, which includes an
interview with Rabbi Allan Smith, director of the UAHC Youth Division
http://www.uahc.org/rjmag/300as.html is the URL.

He was asked: "Is magic and mysticism more appealing among Reform
youth today than in the past?"

Rabbi Smith responds, in part, "Nothing Jewish is alien to Reform Judaism.
My only concern is that they do not get involved with Jewish cults and
become alienated from their families. There is a big difference between
being taken in by Chabad and experimenting with mysticism in their own
communities. We should encourage young people to experiment within our
camps and youth groups, and not go outside of the Movement."

Chabad, in other words, is a "Jewish cult" which "takes people in" and
espouses "alienation from families." Of course, it fails to meet the most
basic definitions of a cult, while teaching that "Honor your Father and
Mother" is a crucial mitzvah. _Who_ does the alienating? Is it the child,
or is it the parent, who has been led to believe that his or her child has
fallen into a dark "Jewish cult?"

And then, Rabbi Smith is asked about intermarriage:

"Is there anything you and members of your staff can say to persuade young
people to marry within the fold?"

He responds: "Appealing to their Jewish communal loyalty doesn't work
because young people see marriage as a very personal decision. The best we
can do is to anchor the Jewish identity of each individual by making
Jewish study and practice an important part of their lives. Young people
see no connection between marriage and their own sense of being Jewish. I
think it's unrealistic to expect our young people to reject the
environment in which they've grown up -- one that places such a high value
on inclusiveness and equality."

Unless the 2000 Population survey offers up some dramatic changes from
1990, it will remain true that well over 50% of children of intermarriage
define themselves as non-Jews -- according to Reform, this means that they
_are_ non-Jews in absolute terms.

Yet, pardon me if I am wrong, it appears that Rabbi Smith is far more
adamant that Reform youth not become chabadskers than that they marry
Jews.

So, in all seriousness: how do _you_ answer the question? If forced to
choose between a potentially non-Jewish grandchild, and a Chabad
grandchild, which would you go for?

Yaakov Menken

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"It is not our task as liberal Jews to complain about the Orthodox attitude or to be bullied by it, but rather to choose our legitimate path according to the inner logic and development of liberal Judaism" (Rabbi Walter Jacob)

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